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N MAY1964, THEAFL-CIO LEADERSHIP INVITED
the head of the South Vietnamese Confederation
of Labor (CVT), Tran Quoc Buu, to Washington
and arranged a one-on-one meeting with President
Lyndon johnson. At the White House, Buu told johnson
that the "missing link in the present Vietnamese chain
of events," was a free Vietnamese labor movement capable of addressing the "daily hardships" suffered by the
country's workers. AFL-CIO President George Meany,
who also attended the Oval Office meeting, and Buu
both hoped to convince the President not only of the
necessity of U.S. intervention-but more importantly the
necessity of the right kind of intervention. What the two
union leaders envisioned was an American engagement
that would place equal weight on economic, social, and
political reform as on the military struggle. Impressed,
Johnson readily agreed that the problems of South Vietnam were as much political as military in nature. 1
The Buu meeting was the most visible example of AFLCIO on-going assistance to the Vietnamese labor movement. As the war in Asia expanded and divided the
country, it proved to be a costly ordeal for American
union leaders and union members. Despite public allegiance to governmental endeavors in Vietnam over several
presidential administrations, Meany and his supporters
tried to pursue independent policies and programs in
the troubled Southeast Asian country. American labor
hoped-unrealistically as it turned out-that if it could
build strong independent unions in Vietnam, a middle
way would be constructed between the repression of the
South Vietnamese state and the horrors of communism.
The American labor movement was not a latecomer
to the problems in Southeast Asia. In the early 1950s,
the AFL was eager to help the Third World construct
free trade unions and other institutions as part of its anticommunist campaign. At a planning session for the newly
formed International Confederation of Free Trade
Unions (ICFTU) in 1950, Irving Brown, the Europeanbased AFL representative, pressed the organization to
send a delegation to French Indo-China, insisting that
he could "think of no more pressing task than organizing in Southeast Asia." A preliminary ICFTU task force
that included American Federation of State, County and
Municipal Employees (AFSCME) Secretary-Treasurer
Gordon Chapman and United Mine Workers of America
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From twenty-two provinces, men and women of the CVT's Fishermen Union attend a twenty-five day training seminar, February 1969.
(UMWA) official john Brophy swept through Southeast
Asia later that year. Their Asian survey included a brief
visit to Vietnam. There, the group saw evidence of anascent labor movement. Officials of the French colonial
government assured the delegation that trade union
rights soon would be extended to all Vietnamese workers.2
Labor issues long had been of concern to the Vietnamese nationalist movement. Their French colonial
overlords had created some of the worst labor conditions
in the world-especially on the country's rubber plantations, where workers toiled in virtual slavery. Influenced
by Chinese and Soviet communists, the language of labor exploitation quickly took hold of the nationalist
movement. The future leader of South Vietnam's labor
movement, Buu, was well schooled in such language. He
eagerly joined the Viet Minh movement, fighting French
colonial control and, when captured by the French, serving prison time alongside future leaders of North Vietnam. By the late 1940s, however, Buu and others grew
disillusioned with the violence and excesses of the Viet

Minh, a movement they came to suspect had more to
do with communism than genuine nationalism. Although a Buddhist himself, Buu began working with
French Catholic trade unionists to build an independent
labor movement for native workers-activity strictly forbidden by French colonial law. Buu eagerly welcomed
the American visitors in 1950, hoping that they might
provide leverage as he dealt with French officials.
Over the next several years, as the French struggled
to retain control over Vietnam, colonial authorities allowed Buu's movement increasing freedom. In 1953, he
christened his now-legal organization the Vietnamese
Confederation ofLabor. The organization quickly grew,
but the Viet Minh victory over the French at Dien Bien
Phu in 1954 put the CVT's progress injeopardy. At the
international Geneva Conference dealing with Southeast
Asia that same year, the AFL advocated the immediate
end ofFrench colonial rule and the formation of a genuinely nationalist army to fight the Viet Minh. 3 vVhen the
conference ignored the AFL's efforts and divided Vietnam along the seventeenth parallel, George Meany,
president of the AFL, bitterly assailed the action as "appeasement" on "a world scale which would make Munich
pale into insignificance. "4
As a result of the Geneva Conference decision, the

CVT faced grave challenges. Thousands of its members
worked above the seventeenth parallel and feared retribution from the Viet Minh. Buu called on international
labor for help resettling trade unionists fleeing from the
north. For a time, hundreds of refugees, with no other
place to go, camped out in the CVT headquarters in
Saigon. By 1956, as the division of Vietnam became a
reality, the newly created AFL-CIO struggled to aid the
CVT, now centered in South Vietnam. But with limited
resources and other pressing labor situations around the
world, American labor could offer little help. The
Eisenhower administration, meanwhile, seeking to hold
the line on military and foreign aid spending, resisted
AFL-CIO calls for U.S. government support for the CVT.
Nevertheless, in 1956, the U.S. Operations Mission in
Saigon did hire Jodie Eggers (formerly of the CIO's International Woodworkers of America) as its labor advisor. Eggers went to work immediately establishing strong
bonds with the CVT. The new labor advisor even spent
his weekends building homes for resettled CVT members. Despite the promise he saw in the new organization, soon he reported tensions between the CVT and
the South Vietnamese government of President Ngo
Dinh Diem had begun to spiral out of control due to
the labor organization's pressure on the government to
democratize the country. When the U.S. government
reassigned Eggers to Pakistan in 1958, the labor aid program he devised quickly disintegrated but the problems
remained. 5
By the start of the 1960s, rumors swirled throughout
Saigon that Buu would be the next in a long line of CVT
officials imprisoned by President Diem. In 1961, concerned about the deteriorating situation, Meany dispatched international affairs expert Irving Brown to
Saigon. Brown quickly recognized a grave situation. "Unless there is a cleansing of the Augean stables and an
introduction of new, hopeful political elements into the
regime, the masses, especially the peasants-will not defend the regime no matter what this government or the
USA says," concluded Brown. Meeting with Buu and
other members of the CVT, he became increasingly convinced that the CVT was just the sort of organization that
could help democratize the nation. 6 Returning to his office in Paris, Brown met frequently over the next avo
years with Vietnamese exiles opposed to Diem. He used
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Members ofTranspmt Workers' Union, Local500 ofPan American Airways in Miami, Florida, prepare to load 3, 000 Christmas gifts for soldiers in Vietnam made possible by union-raised
contributions. This was one of numerous union projects such
as the Communication Workers ofAmerica-sponsored "Call Mom, "
which provided free telephone service to G.I.s in Vietnam.

his contacts to arrange for meetings between dissidents
and high-ranking U.S. officials. Meanwhile, in Vietnam,
while still cautious, Buu grew more outspoken in his criticisms of Diem. In early November 1963, a coup led by
South Vietnamese generals finally ended the oppressive
Diem regime. But the CVT remained vulnerable and Buu
went into hiding to avoid possible arrest, as further coups
and leadership changes brought only greater instability.
Seeking to provide Buu with much needed leverage and
eager to bring the plight of the cvr to the attention of
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President Johnson, the AFL-CIO brought Buu to Washington, D.C. in 1964.
Buu's meeting with Johnson emboldened the CVT
leader, who returned to a South Vietnam increasingly
descending into chaos. Protests against the government
had virtually paralyzed the capital city of Saigon. When
the South Vietnamese government tried to impose new
restrictions on public meetings that would severely hamper labor organizing, Buu announced a general strike
to protest the restrictions. George Meany immediately
sent Buu a telegram, expressing "our all-out unstinting
support to the free and independent workers organized
in the CVT under your great leadership." U.S. Embassy
officials, however, shared none of Meany's enthusiasm.
They worried that the "general strike was an extreme reaction and another example of national indiscipline."'
On September 21, 1964, workers throughout Saigon
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The seafood market at the docks of Phan Thiet, 1968. During
the war years, thousands of Vietnamese fishermen worked the
waters of this coastal city and many were members of the CVT's
Fishermen Union. Since 1975, however, they can no longer count
on the support of an independent trade union.

walked off their jobs and joined in a march to the presidential palace to demand a change in policy. The city
was effectively shut down.
Intimidated by the CVT's show of force, the South
Vietnamese government agreed to drop restrictions on
public gatherings and met other demands. But Buu did
not have long to bask in his success. Only weeks after
the strike, government officials arrested the CVT president on charges of conspiring in a coup against the South
Vietnamese leadership. Meany-infuriated at the arrest-drafted a caustic statement denouncing the government of South Vietnam for its "inhuman and
destructive action in trumping up treason charges against
Buu."8 The AFL-CIO's pressure paid off, and Buu was
acquitted of all charges. Still, it was clear that while the

CVT had potential, it also had enemies. South Vietnamese labor found itself caught awkwardly between the repressive government of South Vietnam and the
dangerous insurgent Viet Cong guerrillas, increasingly
controlling the countryside. As one CVT official put it,
we were "pinched between a mountain and a river."
Despite the obstacles faced by Vietnamese labor, both
the CVT and AFL-CIO felt confident that labor could
make a difference in Vietnam-serving as a vehicle for
social, economic, and political reform. Thus, in the summer of 1965, when Presidentjohnson made the decision to greatly expand the U.S. role in Vietnam with
thousands of American combat troops, the AFL-CIO announced its "unstinting" support for the intervention.
American labor leaders reasoned that only U.S. troops
could provide the much-needed stability for the south
and thwart the communist insurgents who often targeted
CVT organizers for retribution.
American organized labor, however, was not totally
unified in support of Johnson's move. The 1965 AFLCIO convention showed early evidence of dissention and
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division. Walter Reuther, president of the United Automobile Workers (UAW) and president of the AFL-CIO's
Industrial Union Department, helped to rewrite a resolution in support of the war that he considered needlessly strident. UAW Vice President Emil Mazey rose to
denounce the South Vietnamese government as "a corrupt military dictatorship," unworthy of American support. Student anti-war protesters in the visitor's gallery
created a disturbance when Secretary of State Dean Rusk
arrived to address the convention. These episodes foreshadowed growing debate within the house oflabor and
throughout the country. 9
Over the next several years, the AFL-CIO leadership
continued to support the war and seek to build up the
CVT in Vietnam. The American intervention created an
economic boom in South Vietnam, and the AFL-CIO
leaned on the U.S. government to lean on American
firms employing hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese
workers in order that CVT unions receive recognition.
Under these artificially created conditions, CVT unions
prospered. Gains were made not only organizing construction and other urban workers, but also among the
CVT's rural unions, which included tenant farmers and
plantation workers. Inspired by President johnson's optimistic reports, the AFL-CIO felt confident that the war
could be won.
Increasingly, however, with college deferments available to the middle class who could afford ever growing
tuition costs, it proved to be the sons of working people
who did much of the fighting in Vietnam-and suffered
most of the casualties. This accelerated division in the
labor movement. Internal polls taken by various unions
showed deteriorating support for the war, and anti-war
trade unionists were growing more outspoken. On
Veteran's Day, November 11, 1967, peace-minded union
leaders organized the National Labor Assembly for
Peace, a national conference for trade unionists opposed
Workers manufacturing burlap bags in a Saigon factory, Jlvfarch

1970. Although primarily an agrarian country, some light industry existed in Vietnam. The CVT aimed to organize workers
in urban industrial and service sectors and in rural areas on
plantations and farms. Building unions outside cities proved
ve1y dangerous since organizers were likeZy to encounter the dangerous Viet Gong forces.
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to the war. Meany and his supporters considered such
actions counterproductive to the war effort and denounced the planners of the conference in no uncertain terms.
The turning point for American labor in Vietnam
came, as it did for the rest of the country, in the pivotal
year of 1968. The AFL-CIO's hopes that progress would
continue in Vietnam and opposition might be held in
check at home, quickly collapsed in the early weeks of
1968. General Nguyen Loan, head of South Vietnam's
national police force, long had viewed the CVT as a
group of troublemakers, whom he unfairly suspected was
infiltrated by the communist Viet Cong. In early January 1968, when the CVT-affiliated electrical workers
launched a strike against the South Vietnamese government which owned Saigon's major power plant, Loan
had had enough. He surrounded the CVT headquarters
in Saigon with trucks loaded with armed police, who then
marched workers forcibly back to their jobs. Loan also
arrested several high-ranking CVT officials as they conducted negotiations in the labor ministry's offices.
The violent strikebreaking infuriated the AFL-CIO.
But the federation resisted making a public stand against
Loan's actions. CVT leaders had made clear to their
American counterparts that South Vietnamese labor
must appear an autonomous force, not dependent on
outsiders. Such autonomy was deeply valued in a country with a long and painful colonial past. Of course, no
such true independence was possible in the complicated
and dangerous political environment of South Vietnam,
but the legitimacy of an organization like the CVT required it to strive to maintain at least a fa~ade of autonomy. Alongside these concerns, the AFL-CIO feared
that any attacks on the South Vietnamese government
would play into the hands of anti-war protesters, eager
to draw attention to the undemocratic nature of
America's allies. Thus the AFL-CIO maintained an awkward public silence on the arrests. To labor's critics, both
the CVT and the AFL-CIO appeared impotent in the face
of the crisis. Behind the scenes, however, Meany and others pressed the Johnson administration to lean on South
Vietnamese officials to address the situation. Finallyjust before the Vietnamese New Year holiday of Tetunder pressure from the American ambassador, the
South Vietnamese government settled the strike andre58 WINTER/SPRING 2002

leased the remaining jailed labor leaders.
Only days later, Viet Cong guerillas attacked South
Vietnam's major cities, in the process targeting workingclass neighborhoods for propaganda campaigns and CVT
officials for assassination. Violence destroyed the homes
of more than 1,000 members of the CVT. In the midst
of the battle, the entire world was allowed a glimpse of
the brutality of General Loan, the chief of police, when
he summarily executed a suspected terrorist in front of
cameramen. 10
In the wake of the attack, the AFL-CIO attempted to
put the best face on events, announcing that "the terrorist campaign has only hardened the resolve of Vietnamese labor to resist terror and oppression," and
offering emergency funds to help rebuild CVT losses.
AFL-CIO International Affairs Department Director Jay
Lovestone, however, recognized that, while the VietCong
maneuver had fallen short of its objective of cracking
the South Vietnam regime, the tide had shifted.
Lovestone wrote to Meany that the Americans had "underestimated the strength of the enemy." And he acknowledged, "What has happened is no doubt a political
blow to us. "11
But even the end of the Tet Offensive brought no
peace for the CVT. When violence subsided, General
Loan rearrested two CVT leaders-including the CVT
general secretary. Again the AFL-CIO applied pressure
behind the scenes-bluntly informing state department
officials that it would publicly condemn the South Vietnamese government unless the jailed labor leaders were
released. While the American ambassador managed to
gain the release of the general secretary, the other CVT
official continued to languish in jail. Finally, the AFLCIO dispatched its most effective negotiator, Irving
Brown, to Saigon. There he arranged a lengthy meeting
with General Loan. No doubt Brown, who had a reputation for ruthlessness and CIA ties, was characteristically
blunt, perhaps even threatening during the encounter.
Forty-eight hours after his confrontation with Brown,
Loan released the remaining CVT official in custody. 12
The release, however, could have brought little satisfaction to either the CVT or the AFL-CIO. The events of
the first three months of 1968 did much to dash the accumulated optimism of many years. The arrests and
strikebreaking belied the fa~ade of South Vietnamese

Thousands flee from the working-class area of Saigon, known
as Cholon, during the Viet Cong guerilla attack during the Tet
Vietnamese holiday, January 1968. CVT leaders, including
Tran Quae Buu, maintained high visibility during the Tet Of
fensive and the insurgents received little support from neighborhoods such as Cholon. The attack did, however, weaken the
commitment of the American public to the long overseas war.

democracy that the United States had so patiently and
expensively erected. The AFL-CIO's willingness to support President Nguyen Van Thieu's authoritarian government-even if only with silence-suggested a narrow
dogmatism to many onlookers. For the CVI, the illusion
upon which South Vietnamese labor built much of its
success was also greatly damaged.
Things also deteriorated in the U.S. for the AFL-CIO.
Under fire from anti-war challengers, PresidentJohnson,
with whom labor leaders had grown remarkably close,
withdrew from the presidential race in March of 1968.
Meany personally appealed to Vice President Hubert

Humphrey to enter the race-to prevent a complete collapse of the liberal anti-communism agenda. Humphrey,
burdened by the increasingly unpopular war and suffering through the traumatic and violent Chicago convention, slogged into the general election with few
enthusiastic supporters-other than the AFL-CIO.
Thanks to the federation's unprecedented devotion of
resources, the vice president almost won a very close election. But in the end, Vietnam defeated Humphrey, and
the AFL-CIO was now faced with President Richard
Nixon.
Despite deep misgivings, Meany moved to establish a
working relationship with the new President. The AFLCIO president, no doubt, appreciated Nixon's hawkish
stand on the war, but he had a more particular reason
to work with Nixon. In cooperation with the Johnson
administration, the AFL-CIO had created the Asian
American Free Labor Institute (AAFLI) in 1968. AAFLI
was to be an independent organization to promote free,
western-style unions in Asia-particularly in Vietnam,
LABOR'S HERITAGE 59

Some of the 100, 000 construction workers, longshoremen, and
other workers rally at City Hall and surrounding streets in New
York City, chanting "U S.A. all the way" in support of the military effort in Vietnam, May 20, 1970. PeterJ Brennan, president of the Construction Trades Council of Greater New York
and Thomas (Teddy) Gleason, president of the International
Longshoremen's Association addressed the crowd. A1indful of
the violent confrontation between "hardhats" and "peaceniks"
at the same location two weeks earlier, Gleason remarked: "We
want peace as much as the others want it, but we want an honorable peace. "

where it would work to aid the CVf. The Agency for International Development (AID) was to fund the institution, loosely under the direction of the AFL-CIO. Nixon's
support was crucial to maintaining AID funding for

AAFLI.
Meanwhile, the never-ending war continued to create
division within the ranks of labor's leadership. Walter
Reuther, an early supporter of the war, had come to view
the engagement as a costly impediment to social progress
and, by the time of his death in 1970, had become an
outspoken critic of the conflict. That same year, Amalgamated Clothing Workers President Jacob Potofsky lamented that the country was "beset by a host of
problems," and the war in Vietnam "underlies practically
all our troubles." 13
At the grassroots level, anti-war sentiment and activity
60 WINTER/SPRING 2002

grew, fueled in large part by the heavy casualty rate and
toll taken on the lives of young men from working neighborhoods. Patriotism loomed large in blue-collar households. Many anti-war trade unionists found themselves
uncomfortable with the excesses of the peace movement.
Flag burnings and disloyal rhetoric offended many of the
socially more conservative labor activists. At the national
level, Meany and others held the increasingly radical
peace movement in utter contempt. In New York City,
resentment spilled over into violence on May 8, 1970,
when construction workers-"hardhats" as they quickly
became known-attacked anti-war protesters, demonstrating against Nixon's invasion of Cambodia.
Nixon hoped that his support for the war and overt
appeals to working people might lure trade unionists into
the Republican Party. Meany and most in organized labor were unmoved by the president's transparent efforts.
But Meany and his supporters continued to believe in
the war, and remained committed to their vision of the
CVf as a democratizing force in Vietnam. When the
economy, once robust with growth, began to show signs
of weakness-caused in part by the expense of the war
in Southeast Asia-the AFL-CIO did vigorously attack
Nixon's erratic efforts to promote recovery. Still, on the
issue of Vietnam, the AFL-CIO could always be counted
on to support the president.
As in the United States, economic problems also afflicted South Vietnam. Nixon's Vietnamization plan-

Hunter P. Wharton, president of the Operating Engineers (tallest individual); Ben Sharman, International Affairs Representative, Operating Engineers (bach row, wearing conventional
eyeglasses); Morris Paladino, Asian American Free Labor Institute (wearing sunglasses); and joseph Davis, president, Washington State AFL-CIO (wearing sunglasses and carrying coat)
meeting with Vietnamese dock workers and dedicating a hiring
hall for the port of Saigon to replace the old hiring system dominated by gangsters and corrupt government officials, July 1973.
Also during their visit to Vietnam, the AFL-CIO delegation put
pressure on President Thieu to release jailed unionists.

in which South Vietnamese troops gradually were to replace American forces-meant a slowing of U.S. investment, financial support that had created the bubble
upon which the CVT built much of its support. Unemployment became an increasing problem for the CVT.
South Vietnamese unions, after many years of successes,
began losing strikes. Labor-state relations, while an improvement over 1968, remained far from ideal. Privately,
Buu complained endlessly that President Thieu had no
social vision nor sense of how organized labor might
strengthen the struggling country. Meanwhile, the war
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entered a dangerous new phase. The Viet Cong, frustrated by setbacks, launched a terror campaign. On September 21, 1971, two kilos of VC-planted dynamite
rocked CVT headquarters where Buu lived in a small
apartment. The CVT president narrowly escaped with
his life. 14
As the election ofl972 approached, the AFL-CIO leadership faced the unhappy choice between an untrustworthy president, whose domestic policies they despised and
the anti-war candidacy of Senator George McGovern,
whose election would doom any hopes for the future of
the labor federation in South Vietnam. To complicate
matters, that same summer in St. Louis, a group of unionists opposed to the war held a convention and established
an organization called Labor for Peace. In the end, the
AFL-CIO avoided endorsing a presidential candidate but
several unions did split with the leadership and formed
the National Labor Committee for the Election of
McGovern-Shriver.
Mter McGovern's overwhelming defeat, the American
economy slid into a deep recession the following year,
one marked by a frightening stagflation-rising inflation
and unemployment. Mutual distrust marred labor's relationship with the Nixon administration, but liberals in
Congress distanced themselves from the federation due
to the war issue. The AFL-CIO carefully mapped out a
full-employment-based recovery plan, but few were listening.
In January 1973, Nixon announced that he had finally
achieved "peace with honor." In Vietnam, however, Bun
recognized that "peace with honor" was hardly what
Nixon was offering his country; still he hoped that the
American withdrawal would finally allow South Vietnam
to escape the specter of being America's puppet. With
the departure of the Americans, Buu talked of an "awakening of the conscience of the masses"-his hope that
the indifferent and long-suffering peasants and workers
of Vietnam would rally to the anti-communist causenow that it was no longer tainted by the overwhelming
presence of the Americans. 15
The American withdrawal, however, also meant a severe erosion of American leverage over the South Vietnam state-support that had often protected the CVT.
Well aware of this, Meany arranged a personal meeting
with President Thieu during the South Vietnamese
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president's state visit to Washington in March 1973. At
the Blair House meeting, Meany subtly but clearly explained that his support for continuing appropriations
for South Vietnam(the AFL-CIO was one of the few political forces still behind American aid) depended on
Thien's treatment of the CVT. The South Vietnamese
president seemed to understand. 16
In the months that followed, however, Thieu tightened control over his country. That summer, in response
to a labor strike, Thieu imprisoned several labor leaders, including the presidents of four major unions. Again
the AFL-CIO attempted to pressure the state department,
but the American government had lost much of its influence. Finally, Meany dispatched a high-profile AFLCIO delegation to Saigon to negotiate the release of the
jailed unionists. The group included Hunter Wharton,
president of the Operating Engineers Union, Benjamin
Sharman, the international affairs representative for the
International Association of Machinists, and Morris
Paladino, the new director of AAFLI. The delegation,
meeting with Thieu, reminded the president of his promise to Meany. Thieu still insisted on bringing the labor
leaders to trial and convicting them, but he later released
the prisonersY
Ironically, the CVT-despite problems with Thieuwas enjoying some real successes. South Vietnamese labor had lobbied for and helped implement the
Land-to-Tiller Act-a far-reaching land redistribution
program, aimed at shifting ownership of millions of acres
from landlords to tenants. In addition, the CVT formed
its own political party (in part to lobby for land reform).
The CVT's Worker-Farmer Party managed to navigate
the complicated and dangerous political waters of South
Vietnam and make initial inroads.
But the hour was already too late. By early 1975, the
North Vietnamese Army began a full-scale invasion of
the south. South Vietnamese appeals for American aid
fell largely on deaf ears in Congress, but the AFL-CIO
still had enough clout to arrange meetings for Buu. He
arrived in Washington, D.C. on March 15, 1975, for a
desperate round oflobbying on behalf of his government
and met with Senators Henry Jackson and Edward
Kennedy in addition to President Gerald Ford in the
White House. "v\lhatever you can do, do it quickly,"
pleaded Buu at the close of the meeting with Ford. But

Former Vietnamese tenant farmers examine the land titles to
their new property, 1970. Pressured by the CVT and the AFLCIO, the South Vietnam government had launched sweeping
land reform covering three million acres. Unlike the communist
ajJjJroach to the distribution of pmperty, the government provided landlords with some compensation.

aid was not forthcoming and probably would not have
helped. 18
In April, as South Vietnam began to topple, Meany
contacted the U.S. Ambassador to Saigon, Graham Martin, to ask that cvr labor leaders be included in any
evacuation plans. 19 The end came sooner and more dramatically than Martin could have imagined. With North
Vietnamese troops surrounding Saigon in late April, the
evacuation plan finally was set in motion. Endangered
cvr officers and their families were to gather at an appointed site and time, board buses, and be transported

to the Saigon airport. But when the evacuation order finally came, the invading troops had destroyed the airport. There was only room for Buu in the helicopter
airlift from the U.S. embassy. The rest of the CVT officers were to be left behind. Miraculously, the American
embassy labor attache, Emil Lindahal-who before entering state department service was a member ofiUE Local450, Long Island-managed to find a boat in Saigon
harbor willing to take the group. In the last desperate
hours of South Vietnam, the CVT members drifted out
into the South China Sea. On board, they listened to radio reports announcing the fall of Saigon and, ominously, heard many of their names read as among those
ordered to report to the authorities. Mter three days,
the group arrived in the Philippines and eventually made
their way to a refugee encampment in Guam. There, the
cvr officers and their families were reunited with Buu.
The group later moved on to Fort Chaffee, Arkansas,
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John Eisenhower (far left), son of the former president and chairman of President Gerald Ford's Advisory Committee on Refitgees; labor community services representatives; and Pennsylvania
state officials visit the Vietnamese refugee center in Indiantown
Gap, Pennsylvania, temporary home to 11,500 individuals,
September 1975. George Meany served on the Presidential Advisory Committee and the AFL-CIO took a lead in helping resettle thousands of refugees throughout the United States.

where AAFLI and the AFL-CIO Department of Community Services worked to find them sponsors in the United
States. Trade unionists to the end, one of the first tasks
for the group in Arkansas was to organize into committees to delegate duties, represent interests, and air grievances.20
The fall of Saigon, however, did not bring an end to
the war for American labor. With thousands ofVietnamese refugees flowing into the United States at a time when
unemployment was edging upwards toward 10%, many
Americans resented the added burden-especially after
the painful war. But the AFL-CIO insisted that a debt
was owed. Meany accepted a high-profile position on the
seventeen-member presidential advisory committee on
resettlement of Vietnamese refugees. He also committed the AFL-CIO Community Services Department to
helping with the resettlement, dedicated federation
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funds to the cause, and asked all federation locals and
affiliates to help in finding jobs for the refugees. As if
the nightmare of Vietnam would never end, some employers began hiring Vietnamese refugees as strikebreakers. Meany angrily threatened to resign from the
presidential advisory committee unless the White House
took action, which was quickly forthcoming. 21
Members of the CVT who were not lucky enough to
escape Vietnam paid a high price for their union activities. Many spent long years in "reeducation camps." Today, there is no free labor movement in Vietnam. Like
many nations in the region, Vietnam seems to have combined the worst of capitalism and communism-resulting in some of the most exploitive labor conditions in
the world.
Prior to the final fall ofVietnam, Meany reflected back
over labor's longest war. In 1974 on the Dick Cavett television program, Meany, referring to his support of
Johnson and Nixon on Vietnam, confessed, "Ifl' d known
then what I know now I don't think we would have
backed them." He later qualified his comments somewhat, explaining that while "the American people were
not told the truth as to the actual conduct of the war,
the prospects for Vietnamization, etc .... my fundamental belief in the role of the United States as the chief
defender of freedom has not changed one bit. "22
ll
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